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Abstract 
The intent of this paper is to analyze the structural composition of the European 
Monetary Union and its implications for the European Financial Crisis, specifically with 
respect to Greece.  This analysis will be driven by a trend analysis of several economic 
variables from 1999-2010.  These variables range from the 4 requirements set under the 
Maastricht criteria, competitiveness indicators, and relative European trade balances, to 
international investment position. A quantitative and empirical analysis of this data finds 
that the Greek crisis was a result of structural issues with the EMU and the Greek 
government.  The ECB‘s inability to enforce the Maastricht Criteria and independent 
fiscal policy, as well as Greece‘s inability to implement efficient fiscal and economic 
policy, resulted in growing imbalances within the Euro area, as well as a loss of 
competitiveness and irresponsible rise in sovereign debt for Greece.  It is inferred that the 
EMU was ineffective in achieving its goals of integration; that Greece was not ready to 
join the EMU when it did; and therefore Greece as a Member State of the EMU was 
destined to fail.    
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1.  Introduction 
 The Economic and Monetary Union of the European Union had been a long time 
goal for the European area.  Through the Copenhagen criteria and the Treaty of 
Maastricht, several conditions were set for the creation of the European Union (EU) and 
later the single European currency, the euro.  The Maastricht Treaty specifically outlined 
convergence criteria for the third stage of integration, or the monetary union.  These 
criteria included restrictions on a given country‘s inflation rate, annual government 
deficits, and government debt, exchange rate, and long term interest rates.
1
  Despite these 
―strict‖ criteria only a little over a decade after the EMU of seventeen Member States was 
formed, two of its Member States have suffered large economic crises, and several others 
are on the verge of doing the same.  A member since January of 2001, Greece was the 
first of these countries to spiral into an economic downturn and is currently on the verge 
of defaulting on its sovereign debt.  
 If the European states created guidelines that promoted the stability and growth of 
the euro and prevented its disintegration, how and why is the Greek economy faltering?  
Were the mechanisms set in place to monitor EMU members by the European 
Commission (EC), the Economic Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN), and the European 
Central Bank (ECB) effective?  If they were, should there have been additional criteria to 
more fully monitor the health of member economies, including trade balance, 
                                                             
1  Panos Afxentiou, "Convergence, the Maastricht Criteria, and Their Benefits," Economia 
Internazionale / International Economics 53.4 (2000): 437-48. Camera Di Commercio Di Genova, Web, 18 
Nov. 2011, 
<http://www2.econ.iastate.edu/classes/econ353/tesfatsion/MaastrichtConvergenceCriteria.Afxentiou.pdf>, 
p.249. 
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competitiveness indicators, and/or financial data?  If the monitoring mechanism is a 
failure, can Greece truly be at complete fault for its situation, or is the EU also at fault? 
 In order to answer these questions, this thesis will analyze data since the creation 
of the EMU to the present.  These data will include figures for the Maastricht Criteria, as 
well as information on factors mentioned above: relative European trade balances, 
productivity and competiveness indicators, and investment position over the 10-year 
period since the EMU‘s creation.  These data will be taken from institutions such as the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the ECB, and Eurostat.  Mapping out these data over 
the 12-year period, will provide markers to establish points at which someone or some 
entity should have questioned Greece‘s stability, and in which various policies or lack 
thereof served to ameliorate or worsen the economic situation.  This includes policy at 
the national level, by the Greek government, and the supra-national level, by the 
European Central Bank which is in charge of monetary policy for the EMU. 
The issue of responsibility will be addressed through any failures in policy that 
are found.  As well as how the leading European countries followed the Treaty criteria 
themselves.   Questions will arise, such as Greece‘s entrance in the first place. Was it 
ready to join when it did?  Was the monetary unification process rushed if appropriate 
safeguards were not set in place? For instance, were the Maastricht criteria sufficient 
indicators of stability considering other European countries did not follow them but are 
doing well?  What institutions and policies must be implemented in order to restore 
stability to the Euro?   
8 
 
 
 
Going forward these will be pertinent questions to answer as the Euro area 
continues to struggle with repairing the EMU and keeping Greece and other members 
like Ireland and Portugal afloat.  Finding what went wrong will potentially provide a 
guideline for updating the EMU structure, and promote its future stability.  
2.  Background  
 The idea for a single currency area began in the 1900‘s in the wake of ―Black 
Friday,‖ the 1929 New York Stock Exchange crash.  This crash created an economic 
crisis that reverberated around the world that was only magnified with the use of ―beggar-
my-neighbor‖ policies, deflationary monetary policies, and tariff barriers. 2  Such tactics, 
which only served to worsen the economic strength and competitiveness of a country, 
made countries desire a stable economy. 
 As the Second World War continued to devastate Europe, international financial, 
economic, and monetary matters became increasingly important issues to address for life 
after war.  On July 22, 1944, over forty countries signed the Bretton Woods Agreement, 
which created the rules and procedures that would govern the world economy.  Bretton 
Woods led to the creation of what is now known as the World Bank and the IMF. 
3
  In 
1945, The United Nations was created and in 1957, the Treaty of Rome (Treaty) was 
signed by several European countries to establish the European Economic Community 
(EEC).  After two destructive wars, the world had become aware of the importance in 
                                                             
2"Towards a Single Currency: a Brief History of EMU," EUROPA – EU Website, Web, 8 Nov. 
2011, 
<http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/economic_and_monetary_affairs/introducing_euro_practical_aspe
cts/l25007_en.htm>, p. 1. 
3
 Towards a Single 1.  
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increasing cooperation between countries; cooperation that could prevent further 
suffering.
4
  It is this need to maintain order and stability that makes the issue of 
integration amongst the European countries so important.  Europe no longer wanted to be 
divided and frail.  In a new economic order, they wished to be a cohesive thriving region 
that rivaled the United States.   
 By the end of the 1960‘s the Bretton Woods System seemed to be weakening, and 
the turbulent markets were disrupting the stability of European currencies.  To address 
these new problems in 1969, the Barre report was published.  It proposed more 
coordination of economic policies and greater monetary cooperation.
5
  This report gave 
momentum to the promotion and creation of a single currency area.  A 1969 summit at 
The Hague determined the future of Europe when the heads of state chose to create an 
economic and monetary union, which had been an explicit goal of European Integration.
6
  
The following year, the Werner report described the three stages that could lead to a 
European Monetary Union (EMU) over a period of 10 years.
7
    
 In 1979, the European Monetary System (EMS) was created, bringing monetary 
unification one-step closer.  This system was based on fixed, but adjustable exchange 
rates.  Over the following 10 years the EMS and strong political resolve to achieve 
economic convergence, did much towards reducing exchange-rate variability.
8
  In 1985, a 
single market was created amongst the European States, and in 1988, a second three stage 
                                                             
4 Toward a Single1-2. 
5 Toward a Single 2. 
6 Toward a Single 2. 
7 Burak Gündogdu, and Orkun Girban, "Greece's Integration to EMU and Lessons for Turkey," 
Web, 8 Nov. 2011, <http://www.tcmb.gov.tr/yeni/iletisimgm/B_Gundogdu-O_Girban.pdf>, 1. 
8
 Toward a Single 3.  
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plan emerged, the Delors report, to re-emphasize the ultimate goal of a strong and stable 
EMU.
9
  To achieve this goal, Member States would have to reinforce the coordination of 
their economic policies, meet a set of macroeconomic criteria to unite their economies, 
and relinquish monetary policy decision to an independent and newly created European 
Central Bank (ECB).
10
  Two years later the EMU became a reality with the Treaty of the 
European Union.  This treaty contained the specifics of the stages of integration, and 
most importantly a list of economic convergence criteria, known as the Maastricht 
Criteria. 
11
  
  In the first stage Member States began to improve the free movement of capital 
and central bank debts.  In the second stage, which began in 1994, Member States began 
to be supervised by the Commission on their public financing, and the base for the ECB 
was formed to advise states about their independence as central banks and a single 
currency.  In order to move on to the third and final stage of integration, which was 
planned to start in 1997 or 1999 and would mark the beginning of the EMU, Member 
States were to meet the Maastricht Criteria.
12
   
These criteria consisted of several factors, the first of which was the achievement 
of a high degree of price stability.  This would be apparent with a rate of inflation that 
does not exceed the price stability of the three best performing states by 1.5% points
13
. 
The second is the Excessive Deficit Procedure in which the sustainability of the 
                                                             
9 Gündogdu 2. 
10 Gündogdu 2. 
11 Gündogdu 2. 
12 Gündogdu 2. 
13 European Central Bank, Convergence Report, May 2010, Web, 18 Nov. 2011, 
<http://www.ecb.europa.eu>, 9-10. 
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government financial position is determined.  The requirements are to have a ratio of 
planned or actual government deficit to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of 3% or less, 
and a ratio of government debt-to-GDP not exceeding 60%.
14
 The third criterion referred 
to exchange rate stability, governments had to participate in the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism (ERM) for two years without devaluing against the currency of another 
Member State.   Exchange rate stability was given a band under which the rate could 
fluctuate.  This band has ranged from +/- 2.25% to +/- 15% in the history of the ERM.
15
  
The fourth criterion stated that a Member State must have an average nominal long-term 
interest rate no greater than 2 percentage points above that of the three best performing, 
in terms of price stability, Member States.
16
  
 By 1999, the third stage of integration was ready to be put in place with 11 EU 
Member States ready to join; including Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain.  Despite its attempts, 
Greece was unable to join the first Euro area group due to its failure to meet the criteria.  
Greece was experiencing severe political unrest and economic failure at the time the 
Delors report was published.  The Greek Drachma was also not a part of the EMS and 
was not perceived to be ready; their failure posed a problem for any deeper integration of 
the EU.
17
  Greece did not wish to be excluded from the benefits a possible EMU could 
bring.  Over the course of 10 years, since the start of the first stage of integration to the 
third, the Greek government and Central Bank of Greece implemented hard monetary and 
                                                             
14 European Central Bank 11-12. 
15 European Central Bank 13-14. 
16 European Central Bank 15. 
17
 Gündogdu 2. 
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fiscal policies to fulfill the convergence criteria.  It was not until June of 2000 that the 
European Council decided that Greece fulfilled the necessary criteria for entrance into the 
single currency area, and in January of 2001, Greece entered the Euro area.
18
  A year 
later, Euro coins and banknotes were introduced into the market.  
 Greece‘s entry into the EMU differed slightly from the 11 original members.  It 
did not meet the criteria by the 1999 deadline, so in March of 2000, they submitted a new 
request to be re-examined.  The ECB and the EC each examined the extent to which 
Greece had fulfilled the convergence criteria.  They found that Greece‘s average rate of 
inflation was at 2%, which was lower than the reference value of 2.4%.  The government 
deficit had fallen below the reference value of 3% in 1999, to 1.6%.  While government 
debt stood at 104.4%, which was still above the 60% requirement.  However, the ECB 
and the EC conceded on this point because this value had dropped 6.0 percent since 1996.  
Greece was participant of the ERM for at least two years.  Lastly, Greece‘s nominal long-
term interest rate was 6.4% which was also below the reference value.  Despite the debt-
to-GDP ratio Greece was granted admittance into the EMU.
19
    
 In its early years, the EMU proved to be a successful endeavor for the 12 original 
Member States. The positive effect can be seen in increased competition and 
transparency, a reduction in the volatility of exchange rates, and improved price stability.  
These three factors have indirectly affected output growth by reducing investment costs 
                                                             
18 Gündogdu 3. 
19 "Assessment of Greece's Convergence Prior to Its Participation in the Euro Area on 1 January 
2001," Banque De France, Dec. 2006, Web, 26 Nov. 2011, <http://www.banque-
france.fr/gb/eurosys/telechar/europe/04_411EXAMEN_ENTREE_GRECE-GB.pdf >, 1. 
13 
 
 
 
and encouraging inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) into the region.
20
  Several 
reports found that monetary unions increased trade and by 2005, it was suggested that a 
15% effect could be measured.
21
  At the time, it seems the Euro area contributed to an 
increase in cross-border trade in finance, goods, and services, or efficiency gains from 
this market integration.
22
  In terms of financial integration, the Euro area bond market 
was quick to adjust after the adoption of the single currency.  Yield differentials across 
Member States fell sharply, the amount of private bond issues grew, and in general, the 
market structure converged to a common area-wide system.
23
  This factor is significant 
because it confirms that investors regarded the bonds issued by each Member State as 
extremely close substitutes. 
 The goal of the EMU was to create a deeper level of integration in the EU.  
Therefore the convergence of economic variables amongst Member States is a positive 
and desired outcome of the formation of the EMU.  Whereas a divergence of economic 
variables would signify failure o fully integrate member State economies into a single 
Euro area economy.     
Apart from the positive economic benefits, an EC Eurobarometer survey suggested 
that the EMU held a good level of popular support, and that a majority of the Euro area 
                                                             
20 Ray Barrell, Sylvia Gottschalk, Dawn Holland, and Olga Pomerantz, The Impact of EMU on 
Growth and Employment, 318th ed. Economic Papers, Brussels: European Commission, Directorate-
General for Economic and Financial Affairs, 2008, European Commission Economic and Financial Affairs, 
Apr. 2008, Web, 18 Nov. 2011, 2. 
21 Charles Wyplosz, European Monetary Union: The Dark Sides of a Major Success, Economic 
Policy, Vol. 21, No. 46, pp. 207-261, April 2006, Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=895196 or 
doi:10.1111/j.1468-0327.2006.00158, 213. 
22 Philip R. Lane, The Real Effects of EMU, IIIS Discussion Paper Series, London: Centre for 
Economic Policy Research, 2006, Ser. 115. The Institute for International Integration Studies, 5 Apr. 2006. 
Web, 18 Nov. 2011, 4. 
23
 Lane 6. 
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population believed the introduction of the euro was beneficial.  The EMU made 19% of 
its population ―feel more European.‖  It is in these measures that we can see the political 
motivations for integration are being realized in the early years of the EMU.
24
 
 Joining the EMU had particular positive effects for Greece.  Greece experienced 
its highest growth rates since 1999; although this growth cannot be attributed to the EMU 
alone, we can attribute the EMU with a strong contribution to this growth.
25
    The most 
important benefit that membership brought to Greece was the increase in credibility.  
This credibility brought with it a greater volume of trade and FDI, because as interest 
rates decreased, and an implied decrease in risk, borrowing from the Euro area and 
international sources became easier.
26
  The backing of the ECB allowed poorer member 
countries like Greece to run extremely large current account deficits.  Before the 
formation of the EMU investors required such countries to have a larger country risk 
premium to fund large deficits.
27
   
      Despite what seemed like a success, there still existed issues that needed to be 
addressed.  Since the first talks of a single currency region, experts, economists, and 
policy makers doubted the sustainability of such a region.  Since integration was partially 
or mostly based on political considerations, a monetary integration seemed unfeasible 
with some of the poorer EU members.  Before integration, research showed homogeneity 
amongst Germany, France, and the Benelux countries, while the EU-12 showed a 
                                                             
24 Lane 17. 
25 Gündogdu 5. 
26 Gündogdu 5. 
27
 Lane 8. 
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significantly lower level of homogeneity.
28
 Hopes were that this would be remedied once 
the single currency had been implemented, but as it turned out most of the convergence 
of economies occurred before the EMU began, when countries were attempting to meet 
the requirements for entrance.  Once the euro was in play, many countries lost the desire 
to continue stringent fiscal policies.  A report by the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) showed that there was a slowdown in the reform 
process in EMU member States after the introduction of the euro.
29
 
 Another policy that was implemented to promote convergence was the Stability 
and Growth Pact (SGP), an extension to the Maastricht Criteria.  It said that the same 
rules set by Maastricht should apply once the Euro was in circulation.  Once the Euro was 
launched many countries had trouble meeting the strict 3% deficit and 60% debt 
requirements.    If a Member State broke the rules for three consecutive years, the EC 
could enact penalties, in the form of fines up to 0.5% of GDP, and order the culpable 
country to implement correctional mechanisms.
30
  In March of 2005, the SGP was 
reformed to allow countries more flexibility, it created exceptions to what counted as 
spending considered debt.   Exceptions included education spending, research, defense, 
aid, and the unification of Europe.
31
  However the SGP lost credibility and remains so 
because the adjustment time given to these countries to fix their fiscal policy, about three 
                                                             
28 David McKay. "The Political Sustainability of European Monetary Union," British Journal of 
Political Science 29.3 (1999): pp. 463-485, Web, 465-466. 
29 Barrell 26. 
30 "EU Facts: Stability and Growth Pact," CIVITAS: the Institute for the Study of Civil Society, 21 
July 2011, Web, 27 Nov. 2011, <http://www.civitas.org.uk/eufacts/FSECON/EC10.htm>, 1. 
31
 EU Facts 1. 
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years, was may be excessive
32
  This loosening of the restrictions did not help the 
convergence of fiscal and economic policies in the Euro area, instead it actually 
prevented it.
33
   
 What seemed to be a flourishing economic area, with a few recognizable faults, 
became the struggling EMU that we see today.  Many of the benefits of the EMU became 
a source of their troubles.  The benefits, economic growth, coupled with fiscal 
indiscipline by several of the Member States caused increased imbalances within the 
Euro area.  These problems in the context of the United States financial crisis in 2008 
resulted in Europe‘s own crisis. 
 Following the 2007 euro area money markets freeze, and not being spared from 
the 2008 fall of Lehman Brothers, caused the Euro area to experience a recession for the 
first time since its creation.  In October of 2009, the Greek public elected a new 
government headed by George Papandreou. As soon as the new government was in place, 
it admitted that the previous government had been falsifying national accounts for years 
and that the actual deficit was at about 13.6% and debt stood at 300bn Euros, 113% of 
GDP.
34
  These figures prompted worries about the probability of a default on Greek debt, 
whether Greece would have to leave the Euro area, the possibility of contagion to other 
Euro area members, and the future of the EMU.  Most people wondered why a seemingly 
                                                             
32 Guillaume R. Sarrat De Tramezaigues, "Assessing the 2005 Growth and Stability Pact Reform: 
A New Fiscal Policy Rule for the Euro Zone Is Required," International Journal of Economics and 
Finance 2.5 (2010): 140-50, International Journal of Economics and Finance, Canadian Center of Science 
and Education, Nov. 2010,Web, <http://www.ccsenet.org/journal/index.php/ijef/article/view/7972>, 141. 
33 Sarrat 147. 
34 "Europe's Sovereign-debt Crisis: Acropolis Now," The Economist, 29 Apr. 2010, Web. 24 Nov. 
2011, <http://www.economist.com/node/16009099>, 1. "Timeline: The Unfolding Eurozone Crisis," BBC 
News, 27 Oct. 2011, Web, 20 Nov. 2011, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-13856580>, 1. 
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successful monetary union could have turned around so quickly.  Many had not been 
aware of the growing spending, debt, and productivity imbalances amongst the Member 
States.  
 The crisis worsened in 2010.  The Greek government began implementing drastic 
fiscal austerity policies to curb some deficit, as well as underwent a credit rating 
downgrade to below investment grade.
35
  The yield on Greek bonds grew sharply; interest 
rates on ten-year bonds rose to 7.1%, which is the highest rate since the formation of the 
EMU and 4 percentage points higher than German bonds.
36
  This began to spread to other 
countries like Ireland, and Spain; thus answering the question of whether or not the crisis 
would be unique to Greece or if it would cause a domino effect.  As this problem grew, a 
need for a Greek bailout became more prominent, but issues of responsibility and 
whether or not the ECB, and other member countries like Germany, were allowed to 
bailout the failing state arose.  Despite these questions in May of 2010 the IMF and 
Eurozone members agreed on a110bn-euro bailout package to help Greece.
37
   
 In 2011 the situation remains grave.  Greece is still struggling with increasing 
deficit, debt, and interest rates, as well as the continuous enactment of new austerity 
measures.  As of November of 2010, Greece has installed a new prime minister intent on 
tackling the debt crisis, economist and former vice president of the ECB, Lucas 
                                                             
35 "TIMELINE-Euro Zone Debt Crisis," Reuters.com, 14 June 2010, Web. 20 Nov. 2011, 
<http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/06/14/eurozone-crisis-events-idUSLDE65D0LR20100614>, 1.   
36 "Greece's Sovereign-debt Crunch: A Very European Crisis." The Economist. 4 Feb. 2010. Web. 
20 Nov. 2011. <http://www.economist.com/node/15452594>. 
37
 BBC Timeline 1. 
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Papademos.
38
  The crisis is starting to hit not only historically weaker governments, but 
others like Austria and France.  As the Greek sovereign debt crisis has become a definite 
Euro area problem, it is important to understand what went wrong, who the key players 
were, and if the euro can regain stability.    
3.  Literature Review 
 As this issue is very current, there is a wide array of news and opinion articles that 
are circulating.  These articles are attempting to make sense of the financial crisis that 
many had not conceived of.  Many never believed this crisis would take place a mere 10 
years after the formation of the euro zone and the common currency.  In the past year, 
literature pertaining to the Greek financial crisis has examined the flaws in design of the 
EMU.  A variety of explanations have been given as to the nature of these design flaws, 
and different solutions have been presented in order to re-stabilize the EMU and its 
monetary, fiscal, and regulatory policies. 
 An article by Wihlborg, Willett, and Zhang (2010) examines the crisis in Greece 
and other euro zone countries as a result of not only fiscal issues, but of current account 
deficits, and an inability to develop proper internal adjustment mechanisms.  They 
present data showing that instead of price and cost convergence within the euro zone, the 
opposite occurred.  In fact, instead of deficit countries adopting adjustment to their fiscal 
policies, it was the surplus countries that carried out the adjustments that kept these 
surplus countries in good standing and the deficit countries in the crises they face today. 
                                                             
38 Suzane Daley, "Economist Named to Lead Greek Unity Government," New York Times, 10 
Nov. 2011, Web, 12 Nov. 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/11/world/europe/greek-leaders-
resume-talks-on-interim-government.html>, 1. 
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 In the late 1990‘s, the creation of the euro was primarily motivated by political 
interests.  It was an effort by several EU members to move Europe into the third phase of 
regional integration.  Many at the time believed that the EU members were too many and 
did not meet the criteria of what was termed the theory of optimal currency areas.  One of 
the most important of these criteria was that member countries should have the flexibility 
in factor mobility, and price and wage flexibility in order to allow economic adjustments 
without causing recessions in the absence of the ability to change exchange rates.
39
  The 
EU‘s solution to pushing forward further integration was that by induction into the 
currency area those countries, whose economic policies and status were less than desired, 
would fix their policies to create the flexibility needed within and among the euro zone 
countries.  However, increased flexibility in labor markets and better coordination of 
fiscal policies, which were also necessary to maintain the currency area, did not follow its 
formation and the euro zone members failed to consider political economic forces that 
could oppose such changes.  The problem was that once entry was granted, many of the 
innovative fiscal policies ceased to occur, pressure to reform no longer existed.
40
  
 One of the largest failures of the EMU was that countries were often treated as 
one entity, which was not the case.  Even though these countries formed one currency 
area, fiscal policies remained largely at the control of the individual countries, and it was 
in this distinction that the current issues arose.
41
  Financial markets failed to see some of 
the early warning signs of some of the Euro area countries‘ deteriorating financial 
                                                             
39 Clas Wihlborg, Willett, Thomas D and Zhang, Nan, The Euro Crisis: It Isn't Just Fiscal and it 
Doesn't Just Involve Greece (September 8, 2010), Claremont McKenna College Robert Day School of 
Economics and Finance Research Paper No. 2011-03, Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1776133, 4.  
40 Wihlborg 5. 
41
 Wihlborg 6.  
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positions, such as the extent of the mounting debt and their inability to repay this debt 
because of decreased competitiveness.
42
  Wihlborg et al. (2010) comments that in the 
case of the Euro, there was a tendency towards excessive optimism and obliviousness in 
the early periods; financial excesses were made worse by a lack of differentiation among 
Euro area members in pricing Euro area debt.  The current crisis seems to support the 
view that a single currency union without a political or at least a fiscal union is doomed 
to fail; therefore the EMU is at a point where it must either be abandoned or must be 
made stronger.
43
 
 To illustrate the divergence amongst the Euro area countries, only considering the 
12 countries that entered from 1999 to 2001, Wihlborg et al. executed an analysis of 
several factors.  These included annual data of price and cost indices, such as consumer 
price index (CPI), Producer Price Index (PPI), Unit Labor Costs (ULC), and price 
convergence indicators.
44
  They also examined a labor productivity index, and most 
importantly the REER 12.  The REER 12 is the real effective exchange rate for each 
country based on the trade weights within the 12 country euro group.  This variable 
analyzes the movements of competitiveness within the Euro area.  Lastly, they include 
the current account balance as a percent of GDP for each Euro area country.
45
 
 After completing this analysis they found, as they believed, little economic 
convergence amongst the countries.  The currency area created unfavorable 
competitiveness between the more stable countries and the deficit countries.  Inflation 
                                                             
42 Wihlborg 6. 
43 Wihlborg 9. 
44 Wihlborg 13. 
45
 Wihlborg 14. 
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rates, ULC based REER-12, price convergence indicators, and ULC showed a divergence 
from the average, which means a lack of internal balance adjustments within the Euro 
area.
46
  PPI showed a slight, but not significant convergence to the mean. Whereas CPI 
based REER12 and labor productivity showed reversion to the average for the time 
period studied.
47
  The current account balance suggests that intra Euro area adjustment 
mechanisms did not work effectively to control divergences in competitiveness.   
Countries like Germany, Austria, and the Netherlands show increasing surpluses over the 
years, while Greece, Portugal, and Spain suffer from continuous negative balances.
48
 
 From this analysis, several conclusions are derived to analyze the current state of 
affairs in the Euro area.  Greece is surely responsible for their lack of fiscal discipline and 
tendency to conceal the true state of their debt crisis.  However, part of the blame can be 
placed on other EMU members, like Germany and France.  These countries took the need 
for internal adjustments seriously, while not exerting any pressure on the weaker 
countries to do so.  As the years progressed the stronger economies became stronger and 
the weaker economies weaker.
49
  The government debt crisis in the Euro area has 
prompted a desire for increased fiscal coordination within the Euro area, and a stronger 
enforcement of the deficit and debt limits placed by the Maastricht Criteria.  In essence, a 
stronger emphasis on continuously meeting the conditions to enter and remain in the 
monetary union must exist in order for the union to remain.
50
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 Wihlborg et al. (2010) suggests that the creation of a ―European Debt 
Surveillance Authority‖ would be beneficial in that it could establish benchmarks for debt 
for each individual country in the Euro area.  Bond markets and financial markets would 
demand a risk premium associated with said benchmark and a perception of that specific 
government‘s ability to service its debt.  In an effort to reach higher benchmarks, the 
existing marks would incentivize individual countries to reform and enhance their labor 
market flexibility and competitiveness levels.  This proposal for a surveillance authority 
stems from the recognition that the Greek crisis is not just a fiscal matter, and is not a 
problem unique to, or whose blame lies on just, Greece.
51
  
 Another recent paper by Maurer (2010) presents data to support the view that the 
EMU debt crisis, or Eurozone debt crisis, is not due solely to fiscal indiscipline and 
speculative attacks by financial markets but to internal imbalances between Eurozone 
members due to a design fault of the EMU. 
 A look at the government debt-to-GDP ratio of the Eurozone countries currently 
suffering from increased risk premiums on their sovereign debt, Greece, Portugal, 
Ireland, and Spain, shows that on average, this ratio was decreasing slightly until 2008 
when the subprime crisis affected the world economy.  Maurer (2010) suggests that 
because of this slight decline, the low real interest rates that these countries took 
advantage of at the beginning of the EMU did not cause an increase in government 
                                                             
51
 Wihlborg 25-26. 
23 
 
 
 
borrowing that is called fiscal indiscipline.  Rather, it was the private sector that ran up 
debt with the abundant amount of cheap credit available to them. 
52
 
A comparison of nominal and real interest rates conducted in this paper showed that 
at the start of the EMU, nominal interest rate spread for the 12 original members virtually 
disappeared, while the variance coefficient of real interest rate grew because of 
significant differences in inflation amongst the Member States.
53
 The reason for this 
difference in nominal and real terms can be explained through the differences in business 
cycles.  The ECB must choose a uniform nominal interest rate across the Member States, 
which results in a divergence in the real interest rates.  Low inflation countries (L) will 
experience an excess supply of credits, while high inflation countries (H) experience an 
excess demand.  In a currency union, there is no exchange rate risk, therefore the excess 
supply from L is absorbed by the demand from H.
54
  Firstly, H will begin to accumulate 
net debt while L accumulates net wealth.  Secondly, if goods and services, and 
production factors are not perfectly tradable, mobile, or flexible a ―negative self-
reinforcing process is likely to evolve.‖55  
 Maurer (2010) points out that financial markets provide reasonably accurate 
measures of a country‘s investment position.  However they tend to be slow in processing 
information.  In this case, they took too much time in realizing the deteriorating 
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international debt position of the struggling Eurozone countries. This fact also places 
doubts on credit rating agencies, which lack forward-looking abilities.
56
     
 Maurer‘s (2010) empirical data suggested that the current account surplus gap had 
the strongest implication for interest rates of the Eurozone countries.  Based on this 
conclusion Maurer (2010) presents several policy options.  The first is a policy of fiscal 
austerity that will reduce the current account deficit through a decreased government 
budget deficit.  However, the net effect of this type of policy cannot be determined 
beforehand.  In a country where private demand is weak, the possibility of a fiscal 
austerity policy worsening the current account gap cannot be excluded.
57
  Due to this 
weak private demand, the article also proposes a second option, a government deficit 
spending policy that may decrease the current account gap.
58
  
 The third policy option is a default on sovereign debt.  At first, the international 
net debt position (INDP) of the country would decrease, and by this means so will the 
surplus gap.  However, if a large portion of the INDP of a country is private debt, the 
secondary effect of a default on sovereign debt would be that creditors would demand 
higher risk premiums.  This increase in the interest rate would once again increase the 
gap in surplus.  Therefore, a default would have an uncertain effect depending on the 
makeup of a country‘s debt.   With a large share of private debt, a default on sovereign 
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debt must occur with a default on private debt as well, but this might cause bankruptcies 
of private debtors.
59
  Therefore this option may not be suitable either. 
 A fourth possibility is the depreciation of the euro, which would cause higher net 
exports.  In the short to medium term, higher net exports increase the primary current 
account surplus, raise domestic demand for goods, and increase GDP growth.  In the long 
term, it might trigger inflation such that creditors will demand higher risk premiums.  At 
best, this policy option will buy time, and in the meantime will incentivize countries to 
expand their domestic export sector.
60
   
 Therefore, Maurer (2010) also proposes leaving the monetary union as an option 
for the troubled Eurozone members.  Leaving would cause a depreciation of the domestic 
currency and the benefits described above.  Since these countries have high international 
debt positions, reintroducing their own currency will worsen their debt problems and 
signify a partial default on debt.  It will also be difficult for the country to regain 
international creditworthiness, and the only way to do so would be to strengthen its 
export sector without the help of international investors, which would be difficult to do.
61
  
Nevertheless, leaving the union would be a tragedy for the symbolic value of the EMU, 
and given the precarious state of the market this exit might worsen the international 
financial system, which was already on its way to recovery before the Eurozone crisis 
occurred.
62
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Since the EMU is facing several difficult decisions, the important question to 
answer is ―what can be done to make the EMU— or its remains — more stable in the 
future?‖63  One solution is assigning an instrument to the ECB, such that it is able to 
differentiate national interest rates.  An instrument capable of doing this would be a 
national value added tax for credits determined by the ECB.  An ECB dictating some 
fiscal policy is unusual, but this is necessary in a currency region that selected countries 
for mostly for political reasons rather than economic criteria.  In this sense it might be 
necessary for a supra-national organization to handle some fiscal regulation along with 
monetary policy.
64
 
The debt crisis emerged out of the strong divergence that existed and exists in 
business cycles amongst the member countries, which is responsible for the divergence in 
inflation rates, and created the debt-spirals.   Maurer (2010) explains that a central bank 
determined VAT for credits would guarantee, in spite of any future restrictions of 
country-specific fiscal policies, one instrument to fight against country-specific business 
cycles. (Maurer, 2010)   
 4.  Methodology  
In researching and analyzing the dynamics of the Greek financial debt crisis it 
will be important to outline a variety of economic variables over a 12 year period, 1999-
2010.  This period includes the 2 years prior to Greece‘s inclusion into the EMU in which 
the country attempted to gain membership, and the 10 years since it has been a member.  
For most of the variables presented for Greece, a comparison will be done against the 
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average for the Euro area excluding Greece, or an average of the Euro area as a whole, 
and/or another Member State.  In order to have complete data for all the countries used, 
the member countries that will be used in this analysis of the EMU will be Greece and the 
11 original members which include Austria, Belgium, Ireland, France, Luxembourg, 
Germany, Italy, Portugal, Finland, Spain, and the Netherlands.    
The first economic variables analyzed will be the specific criteria required by the 
EMU for membership.  These variables consist of a specific range for inflation, budget 
deficit as a percent of GDP, national public debt, and long-term interest rates.  As these 
are the Euro area‘s definitive measures for a stable economy, it is necessary to evaluate 
whether or not these criteria were upheld since Greece joined the EMU. 
Other variables included in this analysis will include economic growth rates, trade 
balance/deficit variables, labor productivity ratios, ULC, and unemployment rates within 
the Euro area. The purpose of including these other economic variables is to determine 
whether there were other factors that should have been taken into consideration when 
constructing the criterion for membership.  As the current state of the Euro zone shows, 
there were clearly some faults in monitoring the Member States.  Those criteria that were 
selected were not sufficient indicators of economic stability.   
Evaluating these alternate variables will hopefully provide answers for Greece‘s 
current crisis.  I expect there to be some correlation between Greece‘s deteriorating state 
and its relative economic competitiveness level, which is measured through the variables 
listed above, as compared to the rest of the Euro area.  I expect the trade balance and 
28 
 
 
 
investment position of Greece to be decreasing primarily due to a loss of competiveness 
with its Euro Area Member States. 
5.  Data Description 
 To obtain the time series data for each of the variables that will be analyzed, I 
accessed various statistical databases from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), The 
European Central Bank (ECB), Eurostat, and The World Bank.  When available, I 
selected annual data beginning in 1999 until 2010, which is the latest data reported 
without estimates for actual values.  If data were only reported on a monthly basis, then I 
calculated an average value for the 12 month period.  When presenting the Maastricht 
criteria variables, I began the data in 1998 to attain a better sense of the effects of 
attempting to join and joining the EMU for Greece.  Data labeled as EA-11 is an un-
weighted average of a percentage value of the variable for the 11 original EMU members.  
Finally, the data labeled as Maastricht Criteria were either a fixed value set by the EDP or 
I calculated based on the data provided by the databases mentioned above.   
 To evaluate the first of the Maastricht Criteria, I used the CPI Inflation rate, 
expressed in annual percentages of average consumer prices on a year-to-year basis.  This 
variable measures the changes in prices of goods and services, and changes in this rate 
will affect the purchasing power of consumers.  For the Euro Area, a Harmonized Index 
of Consumer Prices (HICP) is used.  The HICPs give comparable measures of inflation, 
and are the official measure of CPI inflation in the Euro Area for monetary policy and in 
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the assessment required under the Maastricht Criteria.
65
  Figure 1 shows that from 1998 
to 1999 Greece‘s inflation rate dropped significantly, from 4.5 to 2.2 percent, until it met 
the criteria and joined the EMU in 2001.  After this point Greek inflation was above the 
allowed levels and well above the average inflation rate for the EA-11.   
 To verify whether the criteria to maintain fiscal stability, the EDP, were 
maintained, I included the data for government budget deficit to GDP, and gross 
government debt to GDP.  These two measures are meant to maintain a smooth 
functioning of the EMU, and demonstrate a Member State‘s sound public finances.66  
Figure 2 demonstrates that once again Greece‘s deficit to GDP decreases in 1999 then 
stays close to the criteria of 3% around the time of its entrance to the EMU.  Over the 
following years Greece quickly increased its budget deficit to a high of 7.4% of GDP 
before the financial crisis in 2008 and then to a high of 15.4% during the crisis.  On 
average the deficit to GDP for the EA-11 states was below the 3% criterion until after the 
financial crisis when this value also went above the 3%.   
Figure 3 illustrates Greece‘s extremely high levels of government debt to GDP 
versus the average of the EA-11 which maintains its debt-to-GDP percentage at the 
maximum allowed under the Maastricht Criteria.  Pre-2008 the difference between the 
EA-11 and Greece is on average about 44%, and post-2008 there is an average difference 
of 70%.    
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 Figure 4 is a depiction of the final criterion, long-term interest rates.  Long-term 
interest rates are based upon government bond yields or comparable securities, taking 
into account the differences in national definition, on the secondary market, gross of tax, 
with a residual maturity of ten years.
67
  In 1998, prior to the EMU, the differential 
between Greece and the EA-11 is approximately 3.7 percentage points.  After the 
creation of the EMU interest rates converge and stay at virtually equal levels until the 
2008 crisis.  From 2009 to 2010, Greek interest rates significantly increase from about 
5.2% to 9%, while the EA-11 slightly decreases from 4% to 3.7%.      
 To measure positive economic effects of EMU membership for Greece, I have 
included the annual percentage growth rate of GDP.  This variable is at market prices 
based on the constant local currency.  The aggregates are based on constant 2000 U.S. 
dollars, and the variable is calculated without deductions for depreciation of fabricated 
assets or for the depletion and degradation of natural resources.
68
  Figure 5 shows that 
prior to 2001, the Greek GDP growth was below the EA-11.  After it joined the EMU, 
Greece had higher GDP growth than the EA-11, on average about 2% higher with a 
maximum 4.8 percent difference in 2003.  After 2008 however, GDP growth became 
negative for the Euro area as a whole, and in 2010 Greek GDP growth continued to be 
negative while the EA-11 grew to 1.7%.     
 To better understand the development of the EMU, several indicators of 
competitiveness are included in this analysis.  Figure 6 illustrates a measure of labor 
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productivity, which is the output that can be produced with a given amount of input of 
labor.
69
  It is measured as an annual index value for person based labor productivity, 
which is neither seasonally nor working day adjusted, and is based on the total economy 
including the rest of the world (all sectors).
70
  Over the 12-year period there is a 
convergence of the labor productivity index between Greece, and the index for the 
changing composition of the Euro area as a whole.  From 2006-2009 Greece has higher 
productivity on average of about 0.8, but in 2010 Greece‘s value is 3 points below the 
Euro area. 
 Another measure of competitiveness included is an index of ULC.  The ECB 
website from which this specific data was acquired, defines ULC as total labor costs per 
unit of output calculated for the euro area.  This is set as a ratio of the total compensation 
per employee to GDP at constant prices per person employed.
71
  Figure 7 displays annual 
data for ULC, neither seasonally nor working day adjusted, derived from the total 
economy including the rest of the world.
72
  From its entrance into the EMU until about 
2006 the index for ULC shows convergence between the Euro area and Greece.  After 
2006 ULC costs in Greece increase at a greater rate than in the Euro area. In 2009, ULC 
in Greece is at about 7 value points above the Euro area. 
 Figure 8 shows unemployment rates in Greece compared to the average 
unemployment rate in the EA-11.  Throughout the 12 year period Greece has an 
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unemployment rate higher than the average for the EA.  However, up until 2009 the 
Greek unemployment rate and the EA-11 rate show convergence.  From 1999 to 2008 the 
unemployment rate for Greece fell on average by about 5%. 
 A common measure of competitiveness is the effective exchange rate index.  The 
CPI-based real effective exchange rate which is included in this analysis is a measure of 
the change in competitiveness of a country.  It takes into account the change in prices 
relative to other countries.  A rise in this index would mean a loss of competitiveness.
73
  
Figure 9 plots the CPI-REER index for Greece, the Euro Area average, two Member 
States that are also undergoing economic problems(Ireland, and Spain), and two Member 
States whose economies are stable (Germany, and France).  Over the 12 year period there 
is convergence of the REER in 2003.  After 2006, the graph shows a trend of the low 
inflation countries like Germany and France begin to depreciate, while high inflation 
countries like Ireland, Spain, and Greece begin to appreciate.   In 2010, Greece has value 
10 points above the Euro area. 
 The implication of these competitiveness indicators can be seen in the balance of 
payments of a country.   The current account of the balance of payments contains 
information on the international trade in goods and services.  It records credits (exports) 
and debits (imports), where a negative balance reflects a current account deficit and 
implies a country is a net debtor and a positive balance reflects a surplus and implies a 
net creditor.
74
  Figure 10A shows the current account balance as a percent of GDP for 
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Greece and the EA-11.  Greece consistently remains at a deficit, on average 10 
percentage points below the EA-11.  There is a sharp increase of about 8 percentage 
points in the current account deficit from 2004 to 2007.  Figure 10B depicts the current 
account balance in millions of Euros to show the actual values as compared to other 
Member States. 
 To further understand the inner workings of the current account I broke it down 
into the trade balance of goods and of services.  Figure 11A depicts trade integration of 
goods as percent of GDP. This is a measure of average imports and exports of goods 
divided by GDP.
75
  If these indexes increase over time then this means the country or 
area is becoming more integrated within the international economy.  The Greek and EA-
11 indexes stay relatively stable; both fluctuate within a 6% band.  However the EA-11 
trade integration percentage is significantly higher than Greece‘s, about 20 percentage 
points more.  Figure 11B displays the trade balance of goods in millions of Euros; Greece 
is running a deficit in goods. 
 Figure 12A shows trade integration of services as a percentage of GDP—the same 
interpretation that applied to goods applies to this variable as well.  The difference 
between Greece and the EA-11 is smaller, an average of about 6%.  Figure 12B shows 
the balance of services in millions of Euros.  In the service industry, Greece is running a 
trade surplus.   
Figure 13 breaks down Greece‘s trade balance within and outside of the EU; as 
well as with its trading partners that make up larger than 5% of the trade value.  This 
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graph demonstrates that over 50% of Greece‘s trade happens within the EU, and its 
largest EMU trading partners are Germany and Italy. 
 The final variable that is analyzed is the International Investment Position (IIP).  
The IMF describes the IIP as a statistical statement that show‘s an economy‘s stock of 
external financial assets and liabilities at a particular point in time.  This is stock is 
created from past external transactions measured according to current market prices and 
exchange rates at a specific point.  It is composed of Direct Investment, Portfolio 
Investment, Financial Derivatives, and Other Investment.
76
  Figure 14A displays IIP as a 
percent of GDP.  While Greece and the EA-11 share similar IIP values at the beginning 
of the period examined, these diverge over the 12 year period to a maximum difference of 
97 percentage points in 2010.  Figure 14B shows the IIP in millions of national currency, 
including ‗euro fixed‘ series for euro area countries. 
 I conclude the data analysis with a breakdown of the liabilities section of Greece‘s 
IIP.  Table 1 illustrates the full breakdown, including Direct Investment in the reporting 
Economy, Portfolio Investment, Financial Derivatives, and Other Investment.  Figure 
15A shows the percentage of liabilities by banks and other sectors in Equity Securities of 
Portfolio Investment.  In this section foreigners are holding a larger portion of portfolio 
equity securities in other sectors.  Figure 15B illustrates the percentage of liabilities by 
banks, government, and other sectors in Bonds and Notes of Portfolio Debt Securities.  In 
terms of Bonds and Notes, foreigners are holding a huge portion of the government debt 
securities as compared to their holdings of banks and other sectors‘ securities.  Figure 
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15C depicts the percentage of liabilities by government, banks, and other sectors of loans 
in other investment.  In this section the largest portion of loans being held by foreigners is 
in the banks.                      
6.  Empirical Findings 
 Given the trends in the data presented above, this section will draw inferences on 
the implications of these trends for the EMU and Greece.  It will analyze what these 
trends meant for the EMU since its creation, the implications of these trends on the 
current situation, and the lessons we can draw from them for the future.  
 In the background section of this paper I described a phenomenon of countries 
attempting to join the EMU by imposing strict fiscal and monetary policies in order to 
meet the requirements for membership, but subsequently, easing up on these stringent 
policies once they were granted membership.  This phenomenon is quantitatively visible 
in several of the graphs presented, particularly in the Maastricht Criteria variables.  Not 
meeting the criteria presents a problem for the EMU since its stability relies on the 
convergence of the economies of Member States.     
 Greek inflation dropped significantly in 1999, but after it had qualified for 
membership in 2001, its inflation rate began to increase once again.  Greece‘s high and 
increasing inflation rates leads to decreased competiveness since their prices are now 
higher, and results in further divergence from the EMU economy as a whole.  High 
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inflation rates also lend to an excess demand for goods and services, further leading the 
high inflation country to accumulate debt.
77
 
 The two measures of fiscal stability, deficit and debt to GDP, also display 
Greece‘s significant divergence from both the average of the Euro Area and the criteria 
mandated by the EDP.  These two variables display a policy failure on both the side of 
Greece and the ECOFIN‘s monitoring of the SGP.   
 The SGP has largely been ineffective in preventing, or maintaining stable fiscal 
levels in the Euro area.  In 2003, Germany and France, the largest and strongest 
economies of the Euro area, broke the EDP rules.  They were the first to do so.  However, 
because of their position they were able to evade any strong action or penalties from the 
ECOFIN on a promise to reach the SGP targets soon.
78
  If, as the Economist wrote, the 
SGP ―is a political totem, a symbol that euro-using countries will not cheat each other,‖ 
than the lack of penalty for some countries and not others was a sign that the SGP was 
weak and is the cause of political fallout between the small and large Member States.
79
   
When Ireland and Portugal broke the EDP penalties were applied more strictly. 
They see the unequal penalties as a case of double standards.  A lack of penalties is also 
frustrating to a country like Austria that is putting forth much greater efforts to abide by 
the requirements
80
  These double standards may have fostered some resentment; which in 
turn may explain why so many of the Member States began to break the EDP.  They may 
                                                             
77 Maurer 7. 
78 EU Facts 1. 
79 EU Facts 1. 
80 "What Is the Stability and Growth Pact?" The Guardian, 27 Nov. 2003, Web. 27 Nov. 2011, 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/nov/27/qanda.business/print>, 1.  
37 
 
 
 
have felt justified in breaking the budgetary requirements if the deficit was broken in the 
pursuit of economic growth.  These were the justifications given by Germany and France 
for reforming the SGP in 2005.
81
    
As described previously, the SGP began with a strict policy for deficit and debt 
levels.  It was later reformed with much more flexible rules, at the request of Germany 
and France.  This flexibility, however, makes it difficult to break its regulations.
82
  The 
SGP is not strong enough to control and affect budgetary discipline.  It lacks credibility 
because of its uneven application of penalties.  Ultimately, fiscal policy and statistic 
reporting are tasked to the Member States.  Therefore, any changes coming from a 
supranational entity are difficult to implement without the compliance of the State itself.  
This presents the failure on behalf of Greece.  While the EMU is unable to 
properly coordinate and implement fiscal policy, it is Greece that failed to maintain a 
stable budget.  While high inflation, higher prices, and an increased demand for goods 
required increased government revenues, the opposite occurred.  The Greek government 
coupled greater spending for social services and goods, with fewer revenue streams due 
to their ineffective tax collection system.  For example the difference between what 
Greek taxpayer‘s owed last year and what was actually paid to the government was a 
third of the total tax revenue.  This approximately represents the size of its budget 
deficit.
83
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After the 2009 sovereign debt crisis emerged, records and interviews showed that 
Greece had entered into a decade- long endeavor to hide actual levels of debt within the 
country.  They were able to do so with the help of a deal made with Goldman-Sachs that 
hid billions in debt from the EC budget overseers.   This deal was treated as a currency 
trade rather than a loan, which aided Greece in meeting the requirements, while 
continuing to spend beyond their means.
84
  Greece has made a string of other similar 
deals in which cash was provided in exchange for future government payments.  This 
deception begs the question of whether Greece should have ever been admitted into the 
EMU.  As a result of its admittance, it is inferred that Greece‘s entrance was a result of 
the strong political motivations to move the EU into a stage of greater integration.   
Although the magnitude of the actual numbers was not known, Greece never met 
the debt-to-GDP requirements.  Despite the fact that even their falsified numbers did not 
meet the criteria, Greece was still admitted because they met the other requirements.  
Commencing in 2004, Eurostat questioned the reliability of Greek Statistical Data, and 
has subsequently needed regular audits of Greek numbers.  Each audit found incorrect 
data.
85
  It seems that Eurostat‘s futile attempts to improve methodological reporting in 
Greece, was another indicator that Greece was not ready to enter the EMU.     
 EMU membership allowed the Greek government to set low long-term interest 
rates.  It allowed them to borrow at lower rates because of its association with the euro.  
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Credit was more readily available which complemented the excess demand for goods. 
The ease, with which some Member States could attain loans and FDI from many 
sources, helped the growth of unsustainable imbalances amongst the Member States. By 
showing no differentiation in lending amongst Member States, financial markets 
weakened rather than strengthened the permanence of fiscal discipline in states like 
Greece.
86
   
These low rates show a failure by investors and those providing loans to Greece, 
to properly assess the risk associated with providing loans to the Greek government 
specifically versus the EMU.  The EMU is a union of monetary policy and with few 
ineffective fiscal regulations.  It is more of a political union and not a cohesive economic 
unit.  It was, therefore, necessary for a differentiation amongst Member States.  Here too 
we can see where there existed a policy failure on behalf of the ECB who dictates 
monetary policy.  The ECB should have implemented a system of varied interest rates, 
based on country specific information on a country‘s ability to repay the loan.         
By looking at the breakdown of Greece‘s decreased IIP, we can see the portion of 
debt being issued to the Greek government, Greek banks, and other sectors in Greece by 
foreigners.  The negative IIP is consistent with the amount of debt each of these sectors 
was accruing in the form of loans, equity and debt securities.  The most important 
component of the IIP that can be used to offer a greater understanding of the debt crisis 
and possible future ramifications of Greece‘s large debt, is acquiring information on the 
countries that are most exposed to Greek debt.  Data compiled by the Bank for 
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International Settlements shows that France and Germany are most exposed to Greek 
debt.  Figure 16 is a visual breakdown of the lending exposure between banks and private 
lending, and government debt exposure.  Of the top eight countries exposed, half of them 
belong to the EMU and five out of eight are part of the EU.  Because a significant portion 
of Greek debt was held by Euro members, we have to wonder why the large amounts of 
lending continued, and why these countries were not worried about Greece‘s ability to 
repay the loans. 
This crisis is not only a story of rampant fiscal deficits and debt, it also a story of 
the EMU‘s effect on trade, productivity, growth, and overall competitiveness.  For 
Greece, membership in the EMU provided a time of seeming prosperity.  Growth rates 
were high, labor productivity was high, FDI inflows were abundant, and consumption 
was high.  However, bank of Greece Governor George Provopoulos said ―high growth 
rates in the past were mainly fuelled by domestic consumption, which outpaced the 
economy‘s production capacity and potential output.‖87  In addition, high growth rates 
and productivity were coupled with high ULC rates.  ULC in Greece was high because of 
the large amounts of social services, benefits and employee compensation.  These 
benefits create a structural issue in which there is a large disincentive to both hire 
workers and seek employment.
88
 Greece‘s issues with ULC are noted in a speech by 
current Greek Prime Minister, and then Vice President of the ECB, Lucas Papademos 
that is reproduced in an ECB report published in 2007.  In this speech he describes that 
                                                             
87 "UPDATE 1-Crisis Exposes Greek Economy's Weakness-cenbanker - Forbes.com." 
Forbes.com. Reuters, 27 Aug. 2011. Web. 27 Nov. 2011. 
<http://www.forbes.com/feeds/afx/2008/11/27/afx5750865.html>, 1. 
88
 McKay 470. 
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―despite very strong productivity growth, increases in compensation per employee have 
resulted in relatively high ULC growth vis-à-vis the euro area average.‖89  He explicitly 
says that this should be a reason for concern because persistent ULC growth above the 
Euro area average can result in losses to competitiveness, and with adverse effects on the 
economy.   
These losses in competitiveness can be seen in the large current account deficit 
Greece incurred over the 12-year period examined in which the EMU was active.  
Greece‘s relative exchange rate was appreciating, and trade integration of goods and 
services did not occur.  Even with recognition from the ECB, it was a little too late to 
implement adjustment mechanisms to alleviate the loss in competitiveness.  Overall, it 
seemed that EMU was beneficial for the core EMU states, like Germany and France, who 
already had a strong economy; while leaving other countries, like Greece, in a worse 
condition.  Whether or not Greece would have ended up in a similar crisis had it not 
entered the EMU can only be left to speculation.    
7.  Conclusion        
 The EMU was largely created by European political will for integration, stability, 
and economic strength in the global economy.  It is for these reasons that the stability of 
the EMU is still being fought for today.  These symbolic reasons are why the ECB and 
IMF refuse to let Greece and other faltering Member States default on their debt.   
                                                             
89 Papademos, Lucas. "ECB: Inflation and Competitiveness Divergences in the Euro Area 
Countries: Causes, Consequences and Policy Responses." ECB: European Central Bank. 7 Sept. 2007. 
Web. 27 Nov. 2011. <http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2007/html/sp070907_2.en.html>. 
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 The EMU was truly a leap of faith.  Little theory existed on the creation of an 
optimal currency area.  The designers of the EMU created criteria they felt would best 
induce a convergence of Member State economies.  Ultimately it was the ECB‘s inability 
to effectively control fiscal policy and control divergences in competiveness that 
hindered monetary integration.  For the most part, Member States of the Euro area 
maintained relatively diverse economies.    
 The analysis conducted in this paper, in the context of research done by others, 
has illustrated a complicated story behind the current Euro crisis.  First of all, the 
Maastricht criteria and monitoring organizations demonstrated a policy failure in 
enforcing the requirements meant to foster monetary integration.  Secondly, the initial 
success of the EMU created a symbolic integration of Member States which resulted in 
fiscal account imbalances.  Countries that normally would be deemed too risky to invest 
in, or required higher interest rates like Greece, were treated on par with stronger 
economies like Germany.  This led to the high levels of sovereign debt in countries that 
should have always been considered too fiscally irresponsible to carry such a debt 
burden.  Thirdly, the EMU caused positive growth rates, and levels of productivity in the 
smaller EMU countries.  However these factors coupled with governments ill-equipped to 
handle this level of growth resulted in high inflation, high current account deficits, and 
ultimately a loss in competitiveness as compared to its largest trading partner, the Euro 
area.        
 The current situation in the Euro area looks bleak.  In spite of this, the strong 
political resolve needed to fix the structural issues within the EMU and within Member 
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States exists.  In order to regain stability the EMU must learn from the past imbalances 
and policy failures.  The creation and/or strengthening of a monitoring agency that will 
not only implement and regulate the SGP but will also monitor factors of competitiveness 
should be considered.  Stronger fiscal coordination, and how to ensure there is follow 
through within each Member States, should be considered.  More research is needed to 
analyze the viability of these options, and others not mentioned here.    
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9. Graphs and Tables 
Figure 1 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, September 
2011 
Figure 2 
 
Source: European Central Bank, Government Statistics 
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Figure 3 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, September 
2011 
Figure 4 
 
Source: European Central Bank, Interest rate statistics (2004 EU Member States & 
ACCBs). Maturity Category: 10 years. (*data available from January through October of 
2011) 
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Figure 5 
 
Source: The World Bank Group, World Development Indicators & Global Development 
Finance 
Figure 6 
 
Source: European Central Bank, ESA95 National Accounts 
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Figure 7 
 
Source: European Central Bank, ESA95 National Accounts 
Figure 8  
 
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics 
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Figure 9 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics 
Figure 10A 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, September 
2011 
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Figure 10B 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payment Statistics 2010 
Figure 11A 
 
Source: Eurostat 
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Figure 11B 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payment Statistics 2010  
Figure 12A 
 
Source: Eurostat 
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Figure 12B 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payment Statistics 2010 
Figure 13 
 
Source: Eurostat, External and intra-European Union Trade Statistical Yearbook Edition: 
2008, 2010, and 12/2010 
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Figure 14A 
 
Source: Eurostat 
Figure 14B 
 
Source: Eurostat. *National Currency: including ‗euro fixed‘ series for euro area 
countries 
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Table 1: International Investment Position- Standard Components Liabilities
90
  
 
                                                             
90
 Source: IMF, BOP. Millions of Euros 
Concept 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Net Assets (A- L) -43317.0 -53157.0 -68061.0 -82864.0 -101557.0 -124122.0 -149187.0 -178164.0 -214467.7 -179182.4 -199406.3 -210261.3
Total Liabilities 102195.0 114659.0 135894.0 162956.0 191607.0 226884.0 279281.0 327200.0 404527.1 404337.0 459797.0 441118.0
1. Direct Investment In 
Reporting Economy, (L)
15316.0 13412.0 15819.0 14838.0 17778.0 20910.0 24743.0 31350.0 36153.0 27390.0 29222.0 26213.0
1.1 Equity Capital and 
Reinvested Earnings, Liabilities 14481.0 12414.0 14884.0 13926.0 17118.0 20131.0 22859.0 29303.0 33731.0 24538.0 27162.0 23088.0
1.2 Other Capital, Liabilities 835.0 998.0 935.0 912.0 660.0 779.0 1884.0 2047.0 2422.0 2852.0 2060.0 3125.0
2. Portfolio Investment 
(Excluding Financial 
Derivatives), (L)
52516.0 61573.0 71277.0 81423.0 105990.0 138357.0 171326.0 194368.0 236437.1 208979.0 238565.0 160001.0
2.1 Portfolio Investment, Equity 
Securities, Liabilities
15141.0 10300.0 8750.0 8034.0 12779.0 20840.0 32180.0 45746.0 63547.0 17168.0 19516.0 12802.0
2.1.1 Banks, Liabilities 4331.0 3976.0 2440.0 2010.0 4198.0 7956.0 11956.0 19203.0 27736.0 6149.0 8736.0 3339.0
2.1.2 Other Sectors, Liabilities 10810.0 6324.0 6310.0 6024.0 8581.0 12884.0 20224.0 26543.0 35811.0 11019.0 10780.0 9463.0
2.2 Portfolio Investment, Debt 
Securities, Liabilities
37375.0 51273.0 62527.0 73389.0 93211.0 117517.0 139146.0 148622.0 172890.1 191811.0 219049.0 147199.0
2.2.1 Bonds and Notes, 
Liabilities
36655.0 50900.0 62355.0 73378.0 93198.0 117465.0 139070.0 148446.0 171684.1 186326.0 210862.0 146030.0
2.2.1.2 General Government, 
Liabilities
36256.0 46963.0 58572.0 69745.0 89334.0 113129.0 134100.0 142768.0 165211.5 176317.0 203418.0 140267.0
2.2.1.3 Banks, Liabilities 0.0 0.0 0.0 26.0 31.0 30.0 27.0 1.0 1.0 1300.0 1300.0 0.0
2.2.1.4 Other Sectors, 
Liabilities
399.0 3937.0 3783.0 3607.0 3833.0 4306.0 4943.0 5677.0 6471.6 8709.0 6144.0 5763.0
2.2.2 Money Market 
Instruments, Liabilities
720.0 373.0 172.0 11.0 13.0 52.0 76.0 176.0 1206.0 5485.0 8187.0 1169.0
2.2.2.2 General Government, 
Liabilities
720.0 373.0 172.0 8.0 5.0 52.0 76.0 176.0 1206.0 5485.0 8187.0 1149.0
2.2.2.3 Banks, Liabilities 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 8.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
2.2.2.4 Other Sectors, 
Liabilities
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.0
3. Financial Derivatives, (L) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
4. Other Investment, (L) 34363.0 39674.0 48798.0 66695.0 67839.0 67617.0 83212.0 101482.0 131937.0 167968.0 192010.0 254904.0
4.1 Trade Credits, (L) 646.0 1151.0 1708.0 1807.0 1384.0 1257.0 1048.0 1316.0 1354.0 1254.0 626.0 1236.0
4.1.1 General Government, 
Liabilities
154.0 172.0 180.0 150.0 40.0 7.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 4.0 3.0 3.0
4.1.2 Other Sectors, Liabilities 492.0 979.0 1528.0 1657.0 1344.0 1250.0 1043.0 1311.0 1349.0 1250.0 623.0 1233.0
4.2 Loans, (L) 33717.0 38523.0 47090.0 64888.0 66455.0 66360.0 82164.0 100166.0 130583.0 166714.0 191384.0 253668.0
4.2.1 Monetary Authorities, 
Liabilities
0.0 0.0 8093.0 17411.0 15353.0 6546.0 7217.0 8183.0 10797.0 35348.0 49036.0 97612.2
4.2.2 General Government, 
Liabilities
7759.0 9325.0 11281.0 11218.0 11164.0 11496.0 11049.0 11711.0 10683.0 10179.0 13338.0 29958.8
4.2.3 Banks, Liabilities 16475.0 20254.0 16883.0 25224.0 28011.0 37482.0 52472.0 68623.0 97423.0 109894.0 111561.0 116422.0
4.2.4 Other Sectors, Liabilities 9483.0 8944.0 10833.0 11035.0 11927.0 10836.0 11426.0 11649.0 11680.0 11293.0 17449.0 9675.0
4.3 Currency & Deposits, (L) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
4.4 Other Liabilities, (L) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
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Figure 15A 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payment Statistics 
Figure 15B 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payment Statistics 
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Figure 15C 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payment Statistics 
Figure 16 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-13798000  
Source: Bank for International Settlements Quarterly Review
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Table 2 
 
Source: Bank for International Settlements Quarterly Review
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Country 
Total lending 
exposure to 
Greece 
(millions) 
Total 
Government 
debt 
exposure to 
Greece 
(millions) 
Total of 24 
countries 145,783 54,196
European 
banks 136,317 52,258
Non-European 
banks 9,466 1,938
France 56,740 14,960
Germany 33,974 22,651
Italy 4,085 2,345
Japan 1,631 432
Spain 974 540
UK 14,060 3,408
US 7,318 1,505
